🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL/HIGH] Fix timing attack vulnerability in token comparison#318
🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL/HIGH] Fix timing attack vulnerability in token comparison#318google-labs-jules[bot] wants to merge 2 commits into
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🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: The Bearer token validation logic contained an early-return check on string/buffer length before calling
crypto.timingSafeEqual. This short-circuit path leaked the length of the valid secret via timing differences.🎯 Impact: An attacker could potentially deduce the exact length of the required secret token by observing the response timing.
🔧 Fix: Removed the length comparison and instead hashed both the provided token and the stored auth tokens to a fixed length (SHA-256) before securely comparing the hashes with
crypto.timingSafeEqual.✅ Verification: Run
bun test ./tests/unit/cli/commands/serve.test.tsand ensure all tests pass. Runbun run test:fullto verify no regressions.PR created automatically by Jules for task 11693402604504019667 started by @YoungSx